Dr Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price, Polish Economic Institute
For lack of a satisfactory term which can clarify what the Three Seas Initiative is and means at the background of more conventional models of international cooperation, I suggest we stick with the original concept and leave it at that: it is an initiative. The advantage of adhering to this term and its unrestricted meaning is that not only does it help to avoid time consuming explanations about how the Three Seas scheme is different from international organizations or treaties with a clear legal status, but – and perhaps more importantly – it enables continuation of effective cooperation independently of political fluctuations at the state level which can be, and indeed has been, a formidable stumbling block for successful completion of projects of strategic importance.
The implication of the above suggestion would not primarily be formal, but pragmatic. The 5-day long study visit filled with most informative meetings and conversations with policy and research experts in Brussels in October of this year made it rather clear that the future success of the Three Seas Initiative is not bound to originate from political declarations but from business ventures. State support is helpful, sometimes crucial, but should not be counted on, at least not as the primary force of leadership and agenda setting in this particular multi-level endeavour. One should not expect long-term consistency of political priorities and objectives in as many as 13 democratic countries. What is more likely to unite individual partners are economic benefits and those are usually better pursued through executive decisions of business leaders driven by problem-solving mindset.
More agreement and mutual understanding can be expected on the level of business enterprises which in any case are the actual agents of the projects that have so far been conducted under the 3SI banner with the aim of boosting the region’s economy. Project-oriented model of co-operation facilitates effective involvement of business actors in the initiative, enabling flexibility and relatively low operating costs.
Lack of sufficient commonalities on the political level does not portend well for sustainability of the presidential format of the 3SI summits either. Presidents change and with them priorities of international co-operation change, too. There is also no supernational power that could secure political continuity. There is no appetite for such role on the EU level. The unclear status of the European Commission as a strategic partner of the Three Seas Initiative has so far not resulted in much meaningful support, and the revision of the EU long-term budget poses a lot of questions about the importance of economic cohesion on the EU priority list and about future funding for projects that fall under that category. Insufficient financial resources to fund ambitious infrastructural, digital and energy projects along with limited prospects for support at the EU level pose an enormous challenge but also an opportunity to seek new paths and less obvious solutions, and those should primarily involve business co-operation.
Contrary to unstable political support for the Three Seas Initiative within and without the collaborating states, the interest of business in carrying out projects of strategic importance and high profitability can be expected to grow, if the 3SI brand shakes off some of its political connotations and promotes bottom-up cooperation instead. The basic structure for such change in emphasis is already there. The Economic and Business Fora that have so far been adjacent to the Three Sea Initiative summits have the potential to provide non-partisan space for dialogue and co-operation of business leaders who are better positioned to manage diverse and uncertain political landscape than incumbent politicians or nominated formal administrators lacking in political and business affiliation.
Flexibility needs notwithstanding, coordination of multi-national projects appears to be a much needed function in the system, but perhaps it does not need to go as far as establishment of permanent institutions. In order to facilitate loose-knit business ventures the simple, yet functional structure provided by the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund could suffice as the administrative and executive centre of commercial activities undertaken to pursue the objectives outlined throughout the Three Seas Initiative joint statements. More instruments of this type could be developed as needs arise, particularly for fostering co-operation in more specific areas, e.g. green infrastructure.
The Hobbesian paradigm of the realist school of international relations, imagining states as rational actors in a competitive, anarchic and fundamentally inimical environment, pursuing calculated interests dictated by the basic need of survival is not an accurate representation of what inter- or multinational interactions are about. At its core, it eliminates trust as a necessary element of any cooperation, and certainly business ventures could not ever succeed without it. This basic fact about human cooperative ventures suggests that business and economic projects could also become a channel through which trust in the Three Seas Initiative framework can be established and developed.
Insufficient financial resources in the Three Seas region require innovative and creative ways to seek funding. Yet, in the current economic and political landscape in Europe these efforts should be increasingly directed outside of the EU. On the economic front, EU ceased to be the world engine of growth and innovation (Mario Draghi’s detailed diagnosis clearly shows how Europe is struggling to compete with China and the US not least because of prioritising climate policy over industrial sources of growth). On the political front, the EU is consciously placing itself in opposition to the US and transatlantic ties.
If green technologies, climate-friendly industries and digitisation are the way forward for the Three Seas region, then attracting funding and know-how from the UK might be the way to go. In a report commissioned in 2021 by a British MP, Daniel Kawczynski, a long list of sound arguments is presented to show that UK’s engagement in the 3SI would be a win-win scenario for all parties involved. While strategic partnerships with the US and Japan give the Three Seas project credibility on the global stage, obvious opportunities from close partnership with British business seem to have been underappreciated. For many reasons co-operation with the UK appears to be more natural for the Three Seas region than that with the US, not least because Amber Infrastructure Group which is the exclusive Investment Adviser to the Three Seas Investment Fund is based in London and British firms are among the top trading partners in many 3SI countries, primarily Poland and Slovenia.
As far as transitioning to a green energy economy goes, the UK has been making substantial progress helped by a comprehensive approach encompassing gradual change in energy production and consumption patterns (e.g. through financial incentives), technological innovation, and effective policy frameworks, including public-private partnerships. The scale of the progress is exemplified by the fact that about 50% of the UK’s electricity is now generated from renewable sources. Several breakthrough technologies (wind turbines, high-efficiency solar panels, energy storage system, green hydrogen), digital solutions enabling more accurate forecasting of energy needs as well as AI-based optimisation of energy consumption and production promise to accelerate the process further. Very costly and ambitious projects have proven to be economically beneficial and foster profitable business ventures as well as development of the green finance sector. Opportunities for established and new companies are increasing and business models are changing across several industries from energy through automotive industry, construction and real estate to manufacturing. The UK is committed to strengthening international collaboration, sharing best practices, and supporting less advanced countries in their green energy transitions. While developing countries have recently been appointed addresses of this help on the state level, the countries in the Three Seas region could also partner with the UK in similar collaboration on the level of joint business and research ventures. According to the British Polish Chamber of Commerce, British investors are indeed most interested in energy (including nuclear), transportation and infrastructure (railway), as well as healthcare and biomedical science projects.
The advantages of developing long-term and ever increasing co-operation with British partners would certainly be helped by shared interest in a stronger transatlantic economic alliance. The role of human and social capital from the Central and Eastern European countries which grew and accumulated through student exchanges and labor migration over the years between EU enlargement in 2004 and Brexit should not be underestimated. In post-communist countries, small and medium size companies which form a majority of their business landscape struggle to enter into collaboration with unknown entities and cannot be expected to enter into risky ventures with companies from foreign countries that they are unfamiliar with. UK is not an unknown entity for most of the 3SI states. Moreover, co-operation with the UK could have important implications for simplification of procedures as Great Britain is an international leader in behavioural innovation for decreasing red tape. Clear and transparent rules along with limited bureaucratic barriers attract investment and create opportunities for smaller firms which struggle with excessively formalistic regulations in the EU.
All in all, it is important that various forms of partnership between the Three Seas countries and third states like the US, Japan and perhaps the UK along the lines suggested above are promoted as alternative ways to further develop the European Union through strengthening of the region. Parallel coordinated efforts to attract funding for regional investment from existing EU programmes should be maintained. Joint regional lobbying practices either under the common 3SI brand or smaller formats should be developed and carried out more consistently and regularly, not merely in order to seek funding but also to conduct close analysis of regulations and take a more active role in their design.
Long-term goals of expanding the 3SI non-political network, enhanced primarily by business co-operation, should include gradual expansion to incorporate scientific, educational and cultural stakeholders.
*The publication was prepared as part of a research trip to Brussels, organized by our project in October 2024.
